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Orders From On High: The Current Struggle over Medicaid
Third Party Recovery Between North Carolina and
the Supreme Court of the United States'
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
INTRODUCTION
Suppose the following: Your client, an indigent, is injured in an
automobile accident by a negligent driver. Unable to cover the medical
expenses, your client applies for and is approved for Medicaid assis-
tance. Medicaid then pays the full cost of the medical expenses arising
from the accident. One year later you represent this victim in a suit
against the negligent driver, eventually reaching a settlement. At some
point during the proceedings, the state department responsible for
administering Medicaid seeks reimbursement for the payments it made
on behalf of your client. Unfortunately for your client, the amount
Medicaid is seeking constitutes a majority of the settlement amount.
How should this problem be handled? Should Medicaid be able to
reimburse itself fully? If not, what percentage of the money expensed
by Medicaid should be reimbursed? What if the damage claim includes
elements other than medical bills, such as future or past lost wages?
By way of statute and the decision in Ezell v. Grace Hospital,2
North Carolina purports to have answered these questions. However,
the recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Arkansas ADHHS v. Ahlborn 3 has rendered the North Carolina
approach moot.4 These contradicting decisions have resulted in an
1. The author would like to thank Yuliya Loshinsky, who first alerted him to this
issue, and Christopher Nichols of the Nichols Law firm, Raleigh, North Carolina,
whose guidance in the development of this Comment was invaluable.
2. 631 S.E.2d 131 (2006), rev. denied 342 N.C. 896 (2006).
3. Arkansas Dep't of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
(2006).
4. See generally John L. Saxon, Medicaid "Liens" on Personal Injury Judgments and
Settlements: The Ahlborn and Ezell Decisions, Social Services Law Bulletin, Number 41,
July 2006. See also JULIE L. BELL ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA PERSONAL INJURY LIENS
MANUAL 160-62 (Christopher R. Nichols ed., 2007).
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unstable personal injury environment for Medicaid beneficiaries in
North Carolina.
This Comment will first present a brief legal background of the
Medicaid program, and specifically its presence in North Carolina. It
will then explore the federal statutes which broadly govern Medicaid
recovery from third parties, as well the North Carolina Medicaid stat-
utes which specifically govern this area of recovery. It will explore the
two decisions, Ezell and Ahlborn, which have clouded this area in
North Carolina. Following that explanation, the aforementioned hypo-
thetical will be revisited and taken through both the North Carolina
and United States Supreme Court's analytical models. Finally, sugges-
tions for both statutory and judicial resolutions of this issue will be
presented. As the legal world of Medicaid is extensive, the scope of this
Comment will necessarily be limited to Medicaid's recovery from liable
third parties.
THE MEDICAID PROGRAM
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
Launched as a cooperative venture of the federal and state govern-
ments in 1965, the Medicaid program was intended to alleviate the
burden of health care costs borne by impoverished Americans.5 Medi-
caid pays health care providers for the medical care that is given to
certain citizens who are unable pay for the care themselves.6 Medicaid
is structured such that the federal and state governments share the
costs of providing that care.7 There is no federal mandate for states to
participate; however, all of the states do, and maintain a Medicaid pro-
gram in one form or another." For many states, Medicaid is the one of
5. "Medicaid represents a major attempt by the federal government to improve
access to medical care for the poor. Its enactment in 1965 (as an amendment to the
Social Security Act of 1935) arguably represented the high-water mark of then-
President Lyndon Johnson's 'War on Poverty."' Judith M. Rosenburg & David T.
Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 545 (1995).
6. "Medicaid provides health insurance to pregnant women, low income children,
parents of dependent children, seniors (age 65 or older), people with disabilities, and
certain other specified groups (such as women diagnosed with breast or cervical
cancer). In addition to belonging to one of these target groups, Medicaid recipients
must satisfy certain financial requirements in order to qualify. Medicaid also
supplements Medicare coverage for many low income seniors or people with
disabilities." LISA J. BERLIN, AN OVERVIEW OF MEDICAID IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, http://
www.familyimpactseminars.org/sncfisOlcOl.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a) (2000).
8. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 268 (2006).
472 [Vol. 30:471
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2008], Art. 3
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol30/iss3/3
MEDICAID THIRD PARTY RECOVERY
the largest expenditures, often second only to education.' Even still,
federal monies constitute the significant majority of the overall funding
for Medicaid.1 ° As a condition of having a Medicaid program and
receiving this federal funding, the states are required to adhere to fed-
eral statutory guidelines.' These guidelines are broad and allow the
states to determine, among other things, the particular eligibility
requirements, the nature of the services offered, and the means of
administration. 12
II. THE FEDERAL GUIDELINES
The federal statutes which govern Medicaid are found in Title XIX
of the Social Security Act, particularly at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.
These statutes provide the basic framework of the program, with the
function of allowing the states to flesh out their respective Medicaid
programs within its bounds. In order to provide this freedom to the
states, the federal statutes are understandably broad. Many elements
of Medicaid are mandated in this statutory scheme, but those statutes
governing areas outside of state recovery from liable third parties are
not within the scope of this Comment.
A. Federal Medicaid Third Party Liability
Medicaid was intended to provide assistance to the poor, but it
was not intended to act as an insurance policy. 13 The program was
intended to be, and for the most part operates as, a payer of last
resort.14 Thus, the federal statutes require the states who participate in
Medicaid to take all reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability
9. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the "Equal
Access" Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673 (2006).
10. E.g. in 2006, the federal government paid 60.69% of North Carolina's Medicaid
expense, North Carolina paid 33.98% combined, and the counties paid 5.34%. NORTH
CAROLINA DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE,
MEDICAID IN NORTH CAROLINA, ANNUAL REPORT 65 (2006), http://www.ncdhhs.gov/
dma/2006report/2006report.pdf. See also Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 275 (2006) (stating "
... the Federal Government pays between 50% and 83% of the costs the State incurs
for patient care... "); The exact percentage of the federal contribution is calculated
under a formula keyed to each State's per capita income. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2000).
12. NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HISTORY OF NORTH
CAROLINA MEDICAID PROGRAM STATE FISCAL YEARS 1970 TO 2006 1 (2006), http://www.
dhhs.state.nc.us/dma/historyofmedicaid.pdf.
13. Suzanne G. Clark, An Accident Waiting to Happen: Arkansas Department of
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn Exposes Inequities in Medical Benefits Legislation,
60 ARK. L. REV. 533 (2007).
14. See S. Rep. No. 99-146 (1985), 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2008]
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of third parties. 15 Once the liability is ascertained the federal statutes
require the state to seek reimbursement to the extent of the legal liabil-
ity. 16 To facilitate recovery of such monies from liable third parties,
states are mandated to pass laws which provide the states a means to
recover these monies. 17 In situations where a third party has a legal
liability to make payments for medical bills and services on behalf of a
beneficiary, the states are required to have in place laws under which
the state is deemed to have acquired the beneficiary's rights to those
payments.' Similar to this is the requirement that states have effective
laws which allow the state to recover medical expenses paid on behalf
of the beneficiary from the third party.' 9 Thus Medicaid beneficiaries
must agree to allow Medicaid to seek payment from third parties as a
condition to receiving Medicaid benefits.' ° In addition, should a bene-
ficiary be awarded or receive monies, federal statutes enable the state
to reimburse itself before the proceeds are remitted to the
beneficiary. 21
B. Federal Medicaid's Ambiguities
As a product of the broad nature of the federal Medicaid guide-
lines, many questions were, and to an extent still are, unanswered.
While the statutory scheme must be broad in order to accomplish the
goal of individual state administration, it is precisely this vague gov-
ernance which led to the various court interpretations that ultimately
have resulted in the current struggle in North Carolina.
These issues are apparent on the face of the statute. The statutes
do not uniformly describe the types of third party payment from
which the government can recover, nor do they definitively state the
limitations of the recovery other than to proscribe liens against benefi-
ciary's property during the beneficiary's lifetime.22 In addition to the
ambiguous provisions, some provisions seem to stand in contradiction
to each other. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(a) limits the state's
recovery to third party compensation for medical expenses, while
other statutes state that the state shall seek reimbursement to the full
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (2000).
16. § 1396a(a)(25)(B); § 1396k(a)(1)(A).
17. See § 1396k(a); 1396a(a)(25)(H).
18. § 1396k(a). "[T]he statute does not sanction an assignment of rights to
payment for anything other than medical expenses-not lost wages, not pain and
suffering, not an inheritance." Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 281 (2006).
19. § 1396(a)(25)(H).
20. See 42 C.F.R. § 433.136 (2005).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b) (2000).
22. See § 1396a(a)(25)(A); § 1396k(a)(1)(A); § 1396p(a)(1).
[Vol. 30:471
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extent of the legal liability of a third party. 23 However, regardless of
these, and any, ambiguities within these statutes, it is within them that
the states are allowed to set up their respective programs. At first
glance, the North Carolina statutes seem to operate well within their
federal parents, but upon closer inspection subtle differences, which
carry significant effect, are revealed.
III. NORTH CAROLINA MEDICAID: THIRD PARTY LIABILITY STATUTES
North Carolina's Medicaid program was created in 1969, and
began operating in 1970.24 The program is principally governed by
chapter 108A of the North Carolina General Statutes. It is administered
by the North Carolina Division of Medical Assistance (hereinafter "NC
DMA") and otherwise by various county authorities.2" As such, the NC
DMA would be the party to initiate recovery or reimbursement from a
third party when a settlement or verdict becomes available.2 6 Since
Medicaid is a statutory creature on both the federal and state level, the
rights surrounding it and its benefits are purely statutory.27
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important statutes
are those which govern third party liability. These three statutes are
section 108A-57, 108A-59, and to a certain extent, 108A-70(b) of the
North Carolina General Statutes.
Section 108A-57 gives the state a general right of subrogation
where third party liability is present.28 It specifically states that the
23. Compare § 1396a(a)(25)(B) (2000) with § 1396k(a)(1)(A).
24. NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE, HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA
MEDICAID PROGRAM STATE FISCAL YEARS 1970 TO 2006 1, http://www.dhhs.state.nc.us/
dma/historyofmedicaid.pdf.
25. Id.
26. The NC DMA has been allowed by the Court to intervene in settlement
proceedings to assert a Medicaid lien on behalf of the state. See e.g., Payne by Rabil v.
State Dep't of Human Resources Division of Medical Assistance, 126 N.C. App. 672
(1997), rev. denied 347 N.C. 269; Ezell v. Grace Hosp., 360 N.C. 529 (2006).
27. For example, subrogation is a right arising from, and normally governed by,
the common law. See generally General Insurance Co. of Am. V. Faulkner, 259 N.C.
317, 324, 130 S.E.2d 645, 651 (1963). However, North Carolina has stated that since
this right is codified, it is governed by the statutes, and not by the common law. Ezell
v. Grace Hosp., 175 N.C. App. 56, 60 (2006).
28. John L. Saxon, Medicaid "Liens" on Personal Injury Judgments and Settlements:
The Ahlborn and Ezell Decisions, Social Services Law Bulletin, Number 41 (July 2006)
( "'Subrogation' may be defined broadly as the substitution of one party (the
subrogee) in place of another (the subrogor) with respect to the second party's
(subrogor's) legal right or claim against a third part (the obligor)."); see also, Id. at
n.23. ("The subrogee, therefore, 'stands in the shoes' of the subrogor with respect to
the subrogor's claim against the third party. Because subrogation puts the subrogee in
2008] 475
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state is subrogated to the extent of all Medicaid payments made on
behalf of a Medicaid beneficiary to all rights of recovery against any
person.29 It also states that the amount of Medicaid's claim or lien is
based on the amount that Medicaid paid on behalf of the benefici-
ary.3 ° The amount or the enforceability of the claim does not change
based on the liability of a third party, such as a tortfeasor's insurance
company, to the beneficiary.31 As far as notice to the beneficiary is
concerned, Medicaid is not required to give notice of its lien to the
beneficiary or the beneficiary's attorney.32
While it may initially seem overbroad, this statute has a built-in
limitation on the right of subrogation. In cases where the Medicaid
beneficiary's attorney receives money in connection with the benefici-
ary's injury, payment of Medicaid's subrogation claim cannot exceed
one-third of the gross amount received. 33 This statute does not inter-
fere with the beneficiary's right to sue a potentially liable third party.34
The beneficiary must disclose to the government the identity of a per-
son or entity that the beneficiary has a claim against,35 but there is no
requirement that the beneficiary notify Medicaid that a suit against a
third party has been initiated.36
Seemingly similar to the right of subrogation, section 108A-59
builds on section 108A-57 by stating that the acceptance of Medicaid
assistance by a Medicaid beneficiary constitutes an assignment of the
Medicaid beneficiary's right to third party benefits.3 7 Not only does
the position of the legal owner of the subrogor's right or claim against the third party it
is similar, but not identical, to an assignment of the subrogor's right or claim by
operation of law.").
29. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-57 (2007).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. BELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 149.
33. BELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 151, fn. 8 ("[nlot[ing] that this one third limitation
only applies when the plaintiff is represented by an attorney."); see also, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 108A-57 (2007)
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-57 (2007).
35. § 108A-57(b) (2007) ("It is a Class 1 misdemeanor for any person seeking or
having obtained assistance under this Part for himself or another to willfully fail to
disclose to the county department of social services or its attorney the identity of any
person or organization against whom the recipient of assistance has a right of
recovery, contractual or otherwise." ).
36. § 108A-57 (2007).
37. § 108A-59 (2007). Subrogation and assignment are distinct legal concepts. See
Payne v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 317 S.E.2d 408, 410-11 (1984). Thus, it is not
entirely clear whether the state's claim against a third party is based on assignment or
subrogation. See John L. Saxon, Medicaid "Liens" on Personal Injury Judgments and
[Vol. 30:471
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the Medicaid beneficiary assign his or her rights to the state at the time
he accepts the assistance, but Medicaid's lien against the proceeds in
the amount of such payments vests on acceptance as well.38 While
North Carolina common law generally prohibits the assignment of the
right to personal injury claims,39 it does not prohibit assigning the
right to the proceeds from personal injury claims.4 °
Finally, section 108A-70(b) provides that to the extent that Medi-
caid has paid for a beneficiary's medical services or health care items,
and where a third party has a legal liability to make those payments,
the state is considered to have acquired the rights of the beneficiary to
payment by any other party.4" While this statute addresses the right to
payment, it is not germane to the conflict between the U.S. Supreme
Court and North Carolina in this area.
DECISIONS, DECISIONS
For the past forty years, the Supreme Court was relatively unclear
about how the states should interpret the application of the federal
Medicaid third party liability statutes to their own programs. Many
state supreme courts ruled in ways much similar to that of North Caro-
lina.42 However, soon after the North Carolina ruling in Ezell v. Grace
Settlements: The Ahlborn and Ezell Decisions, Social Services Law Bulletin, Number 41,
(July 2006).
38. Payne v. State Dep't of Human Resources Division of Medical Assistance, 126
N.C. App. 672 (1997), 486 S.E.2d 469 (1997) (holding that Medicaid's lien vested
when the plaintiff beneficiary accepted Medicaid assistance), rev. denied 347 N.C.
269, 493 S.E.2d 656.
39. N.C. Baptist Hosp. v. Mitchell, 88 N.C. App. 263, 266 (1987) (holding that it is
void as against public policy to assign the right to a tort claim of action); Horton v.
New South Ins. Co., 122 N.C. App. 265, 268 (1996) (holding that action arising out of
contract generally can be assigned; however, assignments of personal tort claims are
void as against public policy because they promote champerty.).
40. The North Carolina Supreme Court distinguishes the assignment of a personal
injury claim and the assignment of the right to the proceeds of a personal injury claim.
This is based on the reasoning that by assigning the right to a personal injury claim,
the assignee is in effect gaining control over the case, and thus any such assignment is
void as against public policy. However, in the case of the assignment of the right to the
proceeds from a personal injury action, the assignee has received no real control over
the case, and therefore such an assignment is not violative of public policy and is
otherwise valid. See Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Authority v. First of Georgia Ins.
Co., 340 N.C. 88, 91, 455 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1995).
41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-70(b) (2007).
42. Wilson v. State, 10 P.3d 1061 (Wash. 2000) (holding that the federal Medicaid
statutes allow recovery from third-party settlements without restriction); Houghton v.
Dep't of Health, 57 P.3d 1067 (Utah 2002) (holding that Medicaid liens against third-
party settlements are valid because Medicaid is reimbursed before the proceeds
7
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Hospital, the Supreme Court handed down the ruling in Arkansas
ADHHS v. Ahlborn, which stands for the opposite proposition. These
contradicting analytical approaches to lien calculation result in very
different outcomes for the Medicaid beneficiary plaintiff in a tort
action.
I. EZELL v. GRACE HOSPITAL
A. Background
This case arose from a medical malpractice claim against a hospi-
tal and a pediatrician.4 3 Soon after Michelle Morland was born, she
developed a respiratory distress condition.44 Her pediatrician, Dr.
John F. Whalley, initiated treatment for the next several hours until
Michelle was finally moved to another hospital.45 Medicaid covered
the cost of this initial treatment, and some of the resulting treatment.46
Years later, Michelle was diagnosed with cerebral palsy.4 7
Suspecting a link between the care Michelle received post-birth
and her cerebral palsy condition, Michelle's grandmother and guard-
ian ad litem brought a malpractice action against Grace Hospital, Dr.
Whalley, and his employer Mountain View Pediatrics.48 Early in the
proceeding, the plaintiff settled with defendant Grace Hospital for
$100,000.00. 4 ' During discovery depositions, expert testimony was
taken which significantly damaged any causal link between the actions
of the pediatrician and the cerebral palsy.50 This prompted a settle-
ment between the plaintiff and the pediatrician, again for
$100,000.00. 5 1
At the settlement approval hearings, NC DMA asserted the state's
right to reimbursement for monies paid on behalf of the beneficiary by
Medicaid.52 Medicaid's total lien was $86,840.92. 5 The trial judge
become the property of the beneficiary.); but c.f. Martin v. City of Rochester, 642
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2002) (holding that the federal Medicaid statutes restrict the state's
recovery for Medicaid liens to the amounts representing compensation for medical
expenses.).
43. Ezell v. Grace Hosp., 175 N.C. App. 56, 58 (2005).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Ezell v. Grace Hosp., 175 N.C. App. 56, 58 (2005).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id at 58-59.
52. Ezell v. Grace Hosp., 175 N.C. App. 56, 59 (2005).
53. Id.
478 [Vol. 30:471
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approved the settlement, but limited NC DMA's recovery to $8,054.01.
This reduced amount represented the past medical expenses he deter-
mined to be causally related to the alleged negligence of the remaining
defendants, Dr. Whalley and Mountain View Pediatrics.54
B. The Appeal
NC DMA filed a timely appeal, asserting that the trial court erred
by limiting the Medicaid lien to the amount Medicaid paid for the med-
ical expenses causally related to the defendant's negligence. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals denied NC DMA's appeal, reading the
section 108A-57 narrowly and finding that the subrogation is limited
to the amount arising from the injury itself.56 In justifying this narrow
reading, the court stated that "the legislature surely did not intend that
DMA could recoup for medical treatment unrelated to the injury for
which the beneficiary received third-party recovery. ''57 To further rebut
NC DMA's argument, the court used an illustrative hypothetical,
explaining that under NC DMA's statutory construction, a Medicaid
beneficiary cancer patient who is injured in an automobile accident
and who settles with a third party could have Medicaid impose a lien
for the prior cancer treatments on the settlement, even though the set-
tlement was for injuries arising out of the automobile accident. 58
C. The Dissent and Final Ruling
Judge Steelman dissented in part, stating that DMA was entitled to
full recovery under North Carolina law. 59 Judge Steelman relied pri-
marily on the decisions of Campbell v. NC Dep't of Human Resources6 °
and Cates v. Wilson 6 1 in formulating his dissent. He read section 108A-
57 broadly and claimed, among other things, that the majority had
incorrectly read clearly separate sentences in the statute as one.62 This
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Ezell v. Grace Hosp., 175 N.C. App. 56, 63 (2005).
57. Id. at 61.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 63-64.
60. 153 N.C. App. 305 (2002) (Holding that it was irrelevant whether a settlement
compensated a plaintiff for medical expenses because North Carolina's subrogation
statute does not restrict defendant's right of subrogation to a beneficiary's right of
recovery only for medical expenses).
61. 321 N.C. 1 (1987) (Holding that North Carolina law entitles the state to full
reimbursement for any Medicaid payments made on a plaintiffs behalf in the event the
plaintiff recovers an award for damages.)
62. Ezell, 175 N.C. App. at 64 (2005).
2008] 479
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dissent is significant, because it not only provided an automatic appeal
to the Supreme Court of North Carolina,63 but it also eventually served
as the basis for the court's reversal. On appeal, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals was reversed, and Judge Steelman's dissent was
adopted.64
This case may be reflective of some other states' supreme court
rulings,65 but it is clearly in conflict with the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Arkansas DHHS v. Ahlborn, and is therefore no longer
good law.
II. ARKANSAS DHHS v. AHLBORN
A. Decision
In 1996, Heidi Ahlborn was injured in a car accident that was
allegedly caused by the negligence of another driver.66 She was unable
to pay for her medical care, so she applied and was accepted for Arkan-
sas' Medicaid assistance.67 Arkansas Medicaid paid approximately
$215,000.00 in various medical bills and expenses which arose from
the car accident.68
Heidi Ahlborn brought an action, the following year, against the
driver of the vehicle who injured her.69 The claim included past and
future medical expenses, lost wages, and lost wage potential.7 ° In
1998, the Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (here-
inafter "ADHHS") intervened in the pending lawsuit and asserted a
lien in the amount of $215,645.30 for medical bills and expenses paid
on behalf of Ahlborn. 7' In 2002, the remaining parties to the action
agreed to settle the claim for $550,000.00.72 As part of the settlement,
Ahlborn and ADHHS stipulated that the settlement represented one-
sixth of the total value of Ahlborn's claim.7 3
ADHHS argued that the lien should be paid in full from the settle-
ment.74 Ahlborn argued that the lien attached only to that portion of
63. N.C. R. App. P. 14(b)(1).
64. Ezell v. Grace Hosp., 360 N.C. 529 (2006).
65. Discussion, supra note 42.
66. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 273, 274 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 273.
70. Id.
71. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 274.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
[Vol. 30:471
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the settlement allocated for past medical expenses related to the acci-
dent.75 Ahlborn filed an action against ADHHS to resolve the matter.
The federal district court found in favor of ADHHS, holding that the
lien was valid and enforceable in full against the settlement because
Ahlborn had assigned her right to any recovery from the third-party
tortfeasor up to the full amount of the payments made on her behalf.76
Ahlborn then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, which reversed, and held that the Arkansas Medi-
caid lien applied only to that portion of the settlement designated for
payment of past medical expenses. 77 ADHHS then appealed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, which granted certiorari and
affirmed.78
The Supreme Court held that Arkansas' third party liability lien
attached only to the portion of Ahlborn's settlement that was desig-
nated for payment of past medical expenses paid by Medicaid. 79 This
amount came out to $35,581.47.80 The Court went on to hold that the
remainder of the claim could not be asserted against the remainder of
the settlement.8 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the Arkan-
sas Medicaid third party liability statutes, namely the lien provision
and the assignment provision, violated the federal Medicaid statute.82
Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, stating that the federal third
party liability provisions require an assignment of no more than the
right to recover the portion of the settlement proceeds which are desig-
nated for past medical bills paid by Medicaid.83 The Court also con-
cluded that federal statutes prohibit state Medicaid programs from
asserting a third party liability claim against a Medicaid beneficiary's
settlement or judgment for personal injury damages other than medi-
cal expenses. 8
4
B. Practical Pitfalls of Ahlborn
While Ahlborn seems to provide clarity, the opinion makes broad
proclamations that may be difficult to implement. The most glaring
example is centered on the apportionment of damages. The parties in
75. Id. at 268.
76. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 274.
77. Id. at 275.
78. Id. at 272.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 274.
81. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 280-81.
82. Id. at 286.
83. Id. at 282.
84. Id. at 286.
20081
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Ahlborn stipulated the total value of the claim and, in effect, stipulated
what portion of the settlement the Medicaid lien represented. 5 It is
reasonable to think this would not be the case in the average dispute,
and such a situation would require the intervention of the court. Fur-
thermore, Ahlborn requires the trial judge take into account all dam-
ages stemming from the negligence of the tortfeasor when calculating
Medicaid's lien. 6 While the Ahlborn analysis may not be simple to
implement, it is not beyond the comprehension of the North Carolina
General Assembly and North Carolina court system.
III. DIFFERENCES HIGHLIGHTED
It is clear that the two decisions are in conflict with one another,
and that the means of analysis presented by each are in contrast. What
is less clear is how these contrasting analytical models affect the Medi-
caid beneficiary plaintiff. The two models result in significantly differ-
ent ends for such plaintiffs. In order to illustrate this difference, we will
return to the introductory hypothetical.
Suppose that in the hypothetical, the total value of your client's
claim against the negligent third party is $1,000,000.00. This claim
includes damages for pain and suffering, past and future medical bills
arising from the injury, and past and future lost wages. In addition,
suppose that North Carolina Medicaid paid $200,000.00 in medical
bills arising from the injury for the client. A settlement is reached with
the defendant in the amount of $400,000.00. Assume that, either by
stipulation or by a judge's decree, $50,000.00 of this amount was
apportioned for medical bills. During the proceedings, NC DMA
asserts Medicaid's lien in the full amount of $200,000.00. Finally,
assume that your attorney's fees constitute one third of the gross settle-
ment. To determine how the proceeds would be disbursed, we look to
the contrasting analytical frameworks presented in the two aforemen-
tioned cases.
A. Ezell Analysis
Under Ezell, one must first determine the total settlement amount,
which was $400,000.00 in the above hypothetical. One-third, or
$133,333.33, of this amount would be allocated for your attorney's
fees.8 7 Since the amount of the Medicaid lien is determined by the
85. Arkansas Dep't of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 274
(2006).
86. See generally Id. at 268.
87. In North Carolina, the assignment statute does not govern private attorney's
fees arrangements between the attorney and client, and regulates the amount of the
482 [Vol. 30:471
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amount of money that Medicaid expensed on behalf of the benefici-
ary,"8 the initial lien amount would be $200,000.00. However, pursu-
ant to section 108A-57, the total Medicaid lien cannot exceed one-third
of the gross settlement amount.8 9 Thus, the lien amount would be
reduced from $200,000.00 to $133,333.33. Therefore, in determining
what amount is available to the client, we subtract the attorney's fees
and the Medicaid lien, which amounts to $266,666.66, from the settle-
ment amount of $400,000.00, to arrive at a sum of $133,333.34 as the
final disbursement to the client.
B. Ahlborn Analysis9"
Under Ahlborn, the amount available to the client is naturally dif-
ferent than under Ezell. The first step in this analysis is to determine
how the damages are apportioned. For the purposes of this hypotheti-
cal, assume that the damages are apportioned (or pro-rated), either by
the judge or by stipulation of the parties, as follows: $200,000.00 in
past medical bills (paid by Medicaid), $400,000.00 for future medical
bills, $200,000.00 for past and future lost wages, and $200,000.00 for
pain and suffering. The next step is to determine the portion of total
damages that the Medicaid lien constitutes. This is done by dividing
the amount of the Medicaid lien, $200,000.00, by the total settlement
amount, $1,000,000.00, 9 1 resulting in 20%. The final step is to multi-
ply the percentage of the total damages that the Medicaid lien consti-
tutes by the amount of the lien.92 This calculation results in a
Medicaid lien in the amount of $40,000.00. Thus, when the attorneys'
fees of $133,333.33, together with the Medicaid lien of $40,000.00 are
subtracted from the total settlement of $400,000.00, the amount avail-
able to the client is $226,666.67.
attorney's fee only as it relates to the amount of the Medicaid lien payable to the
plaintiff. See North Carolina Dep't of Human Resources, Division of Medical
Assistance v. Weaver, 466 S.E.2d 717 (1996).
88. BELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 164.
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-57 (2007).
90. The presentation of this hypothetical analysis is intended merely to highlight
the differences between the two approaches to Medicaid lien calculation in Ezell and
Ahlborn. The hypothetical fact pattern is abbreviated for ease of presentation. For a
more detailed instruction on correctly applying the Ahlborn analysis in North
Carolina, and for otherwise handling a claim of this nature, see JULIE L. BELL ET AL.,
NORTH CAROLINA PERSONAL INJURY LIENS MANUAL 164-70 (Christopher R. Nichols ed.,
2007).
91. Arkansas Dep't of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268
(2006).
92. Id.
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THE CONFLICT
I. OVERVIEW
It is readily apparent that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
decision in Ezell is in conflict with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Ahlborn. Despite Ahlborn's language, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina simply applied the total lien to the total settlement,
capped by the one-third subrogation limitation of section 108A-57.93
The breakdown of the damages actually received in the settlement was
not considered. 94 This application of a Medicaid lien is in direct con-
flict with the language of Ahlborn, which requires the trial judge (or
stipulation of the parties) to divide up the settlement with respect to
each of the claimed damages.95 Ahlborn clearly states that Medicaid's
lien should be reduced to a fair share of the recovery.96
Notwithstanding the fact that the means of analysis are markedly
different, reasons to change the current North Carolina Medicaid reim-
bursement extend beyond simply keeping with orders from a higher
court. North Carolina has an interest in maintaining an efficient per-
sonal injury settlement system, and the reluctance to conform with
Ahlborn has damaged that system. The solutions presented in Ahlborn,
however, are not without issues themselves.
As previously noted, the Ezell and Ahlborn analyses are structur-
ally different. Our hypothetical client would receive nearly $100,000
more under the Ahlborn analysis. Under Ahlborn, the amount available
to the client would invariably rise as the difference between the Medi-
caid lien and the value of the total damages rises.97 This proration of
the state's Medicaid lien ensures that the lien does not infringe on
monies designated for other damages. The lien calculation in Ezell
ignores this, allowing for the full amount of the lien to be asserted from
the full amount of the settlement, unless the lien exceeds one-third of
the gross settlement, at which point the lien would be reduced to one-
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-57 (2007).
94. See generally Ezell v. Grace Hosp. Inc., 631 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 2006).
95. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 268.
96. Id. at 292.
97. For example, if the total value of the damages in this hypothetical were
$2,000,000 instead of $1,000,000, the percentage that the Medicaid lien would
represent would only be 10%. After proration, this would render a Medicaid lien in the
amount of $20,000 and a total amount of $246,666.67 would be disbursed to the
client.
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third of the gross settlement.98 The North Carolina Supreme Court has
not recognized this difference. Not only was the supreme court made
aware of the Ahlborn decision prior to ruling in Ezell, 99 but a petition
in Ezell for rehearing in light of Ahlborn was later denied.'oo
II. EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ON NORTH CAROLINA LAW
This lack of uniformity has changed the landscape of personal
injury settlement negotiations for Medicaid beneficiaries. The role of
the state is in question, as are the aims of the lawyers on each side.
Ambitious plaintiffs' lawyers will certainly attempt to implement an
Ahlborn analysis, while the NC DMA will certainly stick to current
North Carolina law and apply Ezell.' 0 ' This is not a productive per-
sonal injury settlement negotiation environment for either party in a
suit and, furthermore, will work against judicial economy. Attorneys
and judges alike must know the standard in order to correctly apply
the law, and in this situation, the attorneys simply do not know the
correct standard. Plaintiffs' attorneys will argue one way, and the NC
DMA will argue another. Thus, North Carolina should not tarry in
conforming to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation.
THE PATH AHEAD - RESOLUTIONS FOR A STUBBORN STATE
For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Ahlborn decision stands
for the opposite proposition of the Ezell decision. North Carolina
needs to fall in line with the federal statutes and case law. To begin,
Medicaid is a state program which draws its authority from the federal
statutes.' 0 2 Medicaid is a dominantly federally funded program, the
seminal statutes are federal, and the United States Supreme Court has
spoken as to how the statutes are to be interpreted. As such, attempts
by state courts and legislatures, like the North Carolina Supreme
Court in Ezell, to contravene will ultimately fail. The question is not
whether such contravention will ultimately fail, but when. It would not
require an overhaul of the North Carolina system to comply with Ahl-
born, and as such it is the state's duty to correct the issue.
98. See Ezell v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 623 S.E.2d 79, 84 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(Steelman, J., dissenting), rev'd, 631 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 2006), reh'g denied , 641 S.E.2d
4 (N.C. 2006).
99. Both parties submitted notices to the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
making it aware of the decision in Ahlborn. Ezell, 360 N.C. 529 (2006), review denied
342 N.C. 896 (2006). See also BELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 160 n. 26.
100. See Ezell, 641 S.E.2d 4 (N.C. 2006).
101. See generally BELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 147-246.
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
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The solution to this problem must be statutory, as well as judicial.
A condition of participation in Medicaid, and receiving relatively mas-
sive amounts of federal funding, is that the states regulate their own
Medicaid programs in accord with federal Medicaid statutes. 11 3 While
it can be argued that, at one time, the federal statutes were somewhat
ambiguous on the issue of third party liability, any such ambiguity has
since been resolved by Ahlborn. Ahlborn sets out a clear and applicable
analytical framework under which these issues can be resolved. The
North Carolina General Assembly bears the burden of drafting statutes
which comply with the Ahlborn decision, but North Carolina courts
have the obligation to apply Ahlborn now.
I. THE ADHERENCE OF THE NORTH CAROLINA COURTS
The first step is for the North Carolina court system to both
respect and implement the decision of the United States Supreme
Court. This is the most obvious solution, but it is not without compli-
cation. 10 4 The Ahlborn decision first requires that either the parties, or
the courts by decree, apportion the damages by category. 105 This is
contrary to North Carolina common law.10 6 The solution is that in the
instance of Medicaid third party liability, or otherwise in general, dam-
ages must be available for categorization. While it may otherwise be
contrary to North Carolina case law, 10 7 North Carolina courts must be
willing to apportion the damages should the parties be unable to stipu-
late the proportions themselves. In addition, the Supreme Court of
North Carolina must be prepared to overrule the Ezell decision.'0 8
103. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2000) (providing federal guidelines to state
Medicaid programs).
104. The NC DMA has argued that Ahlborn does not apply in North Carolina based
on distinctions between the Arkansas and North Carolina statutory schemes. BELL ET
AL., supra note 4, at 155. This failure by the NC DMA to apply Ahlborn is but one
contributing factor to the uncertainty surrounding this issue in North Carolina.
105. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
106. See Ezell v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 623 S.E.2d 79, 85 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)
(Steelman, J., dissenting) (stating "[olur cases have consistently rejected attempts by
plaintiffs to characterize portions of settlements as being for medical bills or for pain
and suffering in order to circumvent DMA's statutory lien").
107. Id.
108. The Supreme Court of North Carolina has the opportunity to resolve this issue
in the ongoing case Andrews, et. al., v. North Carolina Department of Health and
Human Services, Division of Medical Assistance. "Because I find that our Supreme
Court has not yet squarely answered the question presented to us by this case, I certify
by dissent for a decision on the issue of whether the amount of the State Division of
Medical Assistance's subrogation claim on a Medicaid recipient's settlement is
controlled by the United States Supreme Court decision in Arkansas Department of
[Vol. 30:471486
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II. STATUTORY CHANGE
While the North Carolina court system should be ruling under the
instruction of Ahlborn, the real solution must come from the North
Carolina General Assembly. To resolve any remaining ambiguities and
improper case law, the North Carolina General Assembly should
amend, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's instruction, the statutes
which govern Medicaid third party liability.
Section 108A-57 of the North Carolina General Statutes should be
revised to read that the right of subrogation extends to those monies
which are causally related to the cause of action of the plaintiff against
the defendant. This would limit, in accordance with the statutory inter-
pretation of Ahlborn, the right of subrogation and, effectively, the
amount of the Medicaid lien, to the amount of the monies paid by
Medicaid for the medical bills of the beneficiary. In a similar fashion,
section 108A-59 should be amended such that the beneficiary's assign-
ment of the right to payments from a third-party for medical bills
extends only to those amounts which constitute payments for medical
expenses. This could also be accomplished by creating a new statutory
provision which simply codifies the Ahlborn decision.
Finally, the North Carolina General Assembly must create a
means or method by which personal injury damages can be appor-
tioned. This provision should be set up such that the parties may stip-
ulate the apportionment of the damages. If the parties are not able to
reach agreement, then the trial judge should have the authority to do
so.10 9 In the past, North Carolina plaintiffs have attempted to appor-
tion damages in order to avoid the Medicaid lien. 110 To protect the
interest of the state in the proceedings, the statute should mandate that
the NC DMA participate in the settlement negotiations. Such a man-
date would not deter settlement, but would provide a back up means of
resolution should an agreement fail to materialize.
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 126 S. Ct.1752, 164 L. Ed. 2d 459
(2006)." Andrews, et. al., v. North Carolina Department of Health and Human
Services, Division of Medical Assistance, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 91, *10 (Wynn, J.
Dissenting).
109. Examples of similar models for such systems of apportionment have been used
in both Minnesota and Wisconsin. See Henning v. Wineman, 306 N.W.2d 550, 551
(Minn. 1981) (holding that the district court has the jurisdiction to allocate the
proceeds of a third party settlement between amounts recoverable under workers'
compensation and amounts not so recoverable); See also Rimes v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 316 N.W.2d 348, 356 (Wis. 1982) (holding that the trial court was not in error
when it determined what sum would have made the plaintiffs whole).
110. Discussion, supra note 106.
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CONCLUSION
With a clear voice, the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken as to the
way it expects the states to interpret the federal Medicaid statutes. The
North Carolina General Assembly and the North Carolina Supreme
Court's failure to adhere to the Ahlborn decision has clouded the inter-
pretation of Medicaid statutes in North Carolina, and will only injure
those indigents that Medicaid was designed to aid. To prevent further
injury, and to fulfill the obligation of the state to abide by the federal
statutory scheme, the North Carolina General Assembly must amend
the current statutes which govern North Carolina Medicaid, and the
North Carolina court system must enforce these amended statutes in
accord with the Ahlborn decision. The aforementioned proposed solu-
tions are both practical and feasible and would result in North Caro-
lina finally fulfilling its obligation to operate Medicaid within the
guidelines of the federal statutes.
Allen N. Trask, III
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